Tanzania’s health ministry reports that 88% of its clinic managers and 95% of its district health officials now feel their facilities have real financial autonomy. That finding, from a paper published in September 2026, is genuinely worth taking seriously — and it sits two paragraphs away from a number that complicates it considerably: the funds those clinics actually control cover roughly a fifth of what they spend.
The paper, Effects, Challenges, and Preconditions for Implementing Direct Health Facility Financing and the Prime Vendor Model…The Experience from Tanzania (Binyaruka, Ndeki, Kiwesa, Joseph & Salum, Health Systems & Reform), is written partly by the officials who ran the reform, and it is admirably candid about both halves of the story. Direct Health Facility Financing (DHFF) put operating funds straight into each clinic’s own bank account from 2017/18, instead of routing them through district offices. The paper states plainly that these funds “primarily cover operating expenses, which account for almost 20% of total facility-level health expenditure, while salaries, commodity financing (receipt in kind) and capital investments are managed centrally (around 80%).” Four-fifths of what a clinic actually spends was never on the table.
Feeling empowered and being empowered are different measurements
None of this makes the 88%/95% autonomy finding false. People can feel, accurately, that they have far more control over the slice of money they now manage directly than they did when a district office managed it for them. The reform genuinely changed something real: bank accounts, planning authority, a formal line in the government’s chart of accounts. The problem is using a perception survey about a fifth of the budget to stand in for a claim about the whole budget — and the paper itself doesn’t quite resist that slide, opening its results with the autonomy percentages before getting to the scope that bounds them.
It gets narrower again once you look inside that fifth. Specific rules earmark 35% of one major fund stream and 50% of another for medicines specifically, which means a meaningful share of the “autonomous” money was never discretionary either — it was allocated by rule before the facility ever saw it. Autonomy, measured carefully, is autonomy over what’s left after the rules that still apply to the autonomous portion have taken their cut.
If you are designing this
Three questions worth asking before calling a facility-financing reform a success:
- Report the share of total spend that actually moved, not just how people feel about the share that did. A perception survey measures legitimacy and morale, which matter — but they answer a different question than “how much control changed hands,” and a design decision needs the second answer, not the first.
- Audit the earmarking inside the devolved slice, not just the slice’s size. A rule that pre-allocates 35-50% of the “autonomous” money for a specific category is re-centralising a decision by another name. If that’s the right call clinically, fine — but count it as a constraint on autonomy, not as autonomy.
- Decide, in writing, whether the current share is a phase or a destination. A fifth of spending is a reasonable place to start a decentralisation reform. It’s a much less reasonable place to stop, by accident, because nobody built in a mechanism to revisit the boundary once the first rollout succeeded on its own terms.
A reform can be a genuine success and still be smaller than its own headline number suggests. The honest version of this story isn’t “autonomy failed” — it’s “autonomy arrived for a fifth of the money, and the other four-fifths is still waiting to be asked about.”
Strategic Purchasing for UHC: The Open Questions, the monthly research webinar series I convene at Wits, takes up questions exactly like this one. The next session — Exploring South African UHC and Strategic Purchasing Efforts — runs Wednesday 2 December 2026, 14:00–15:30 SAST. Register here.
Further reading
- Binyaruka P, Ndeki D, Kiwesa R, Joseph R, Salum B, Effects, Challenges, and Preconditions for Implementing Direct Health Facility Financing and the Prime Vendor Model in Low-Resource Settings: The Experience from Tanzania — Health Systems & Reform, 2026
- Hanson K et al., The Lancet Global Health Commission on financing primary health care: putting people at the centre — Lancet Global Health, 2022 (the PHC-financing framework the Tanzania paper itself builds on)
- SP4UHC literature bibliography and research resources — profmoosa.com/sp4uhc-research
Prof Shabir Moosa is a family physician and health-systems strategist, Associate Professor in Family Medicine & Primary Care at the University of the Witwatersrand, lead author of a Lancet Global Health paper on PHC financing, and convenor of SP4UHC: Strategic Purchasing for UHC.
⚠️ Declaration
SP4UHC is a personal academic initiative, run separately from my position at the National Department of Health. Because I also serve as Medical Specialist for PHC & OPD Contracting in the NHI Branch, I hold a conflict of interest there and cannot share or comment on anything relating to that work — this blog stays strictly academic and international in scope.
This content was prepared with the help of AI tools. Always check official sources.